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Abstract: The Bitcoin network not only is vulnerable to cyber-attacks but currently represents the
most frequently used cryptocurrency for concealing illicit activities. Typically, Bitcoin activity is
monitored by decreasing anonymity of its entities using machine learning-based techniques, which
consider the whole blockchain. This entails two issues: first, it increases the complexity of the analysis
requiring higher efforts and, second, it may hide network micro-dynamics important for detecting
short-term changes in entity behavioral patterns. The aim of this paper is to address both issues by
performing a “temporal dissection” of the Bitcoin blockchain, i.e., dividing it into smaller temporal
batches to achieve entity classification. The idea is that a machine learning model trained on a certain
time-interval (batch) should achieve good classification performance when tested on another batch if
entity behavioral patterns are similar. We apply cascading machine learning principles—a type of
ensemble learning applying stacking techniques—introducing a “k-fold cross-testing” concept across
batches of varying size. Results show that blockchain batch size used for entity classification could
be reduced for certain classes (Exchange, Gambling, and eWallet) as classification rates did not vary
significantly with batch size; suggesting that behavioral patterns did not change significantly over
time. Mixer and Market class detection, however, can be negatively affected. A deeper analysis of
Mining Pool behavior showed that models trained on recent data perform better than models trained
on older data, suggesting that “typical” Mining Pool behavior may be represented better by recent
data. This work provides a first step towards uncovering entity behavioral changes via temporal
dissection of blockchain data.
Keywords: Bitcoin analysis; behavioral patterns; machine learning; time-series analysis; entities
detection; ensemble learning
1. Introduction
Bitcoin is a decentralized peer-to-peer cryptocurrency (or crypto) where all transactions are stored
in a blockchain [1]—a public ledger that cannot be manipulated or changed [2]. Its features have made
Bitcoin one of the most frequently used and priced cryptocurrencies.
The increasing price of Bitcoin has recently raised questions concerning the cybersecurity of
the Bitcoin network. Its blockchain architecture makes Bitcoin almost invulnerable and too hard to
attack [3], which has led hackers to directly attack single nodes (entities) of the network.
According to a study presented in [4], entities such as Exchanges, Mining Pools, Gambling
operators, eWallets, and financial services are much more likely to be attacked than other services.
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In particular, Ref. [4] demonstrated that the size of Mining Pools, for example, is related to the
probability of being a target of an attack.
Bitcoin not only is vulnerable to cyber-attacks but is also the most frequently used
cryptocurrency for concealing illicit activities, as confirmed by Jonathan Levin, co-founder and
COO of Chainalysis [5,6]. In [7], authors state that Bitcoin is the dominant cryptocurrency used
in criminal activities due to the non-transparent transactions and due to the lack of effective regulatory
mechanisms. Fanusie et al. [8] describes that, from 2013 to 2016, the number of illicit entities
(Market, Ponzi, Malware, etc.) were multiplied by five and two types of services—Mixers and
Gambling—increased their volume of transactions involved in money laundering activities.
Hence, a crucial step to address Bitcoin network security and detect both cyber-attacks and illicit
activities is to uncover the network behavior of sensible targets—of entities potentially involved
in or targets of illicit activities. Generally, this is achieved by reducing the anonymity of users.
Although Bitcoin is usually described as an anonymous system, it is actually pseudo-anonymous [9],
as it is possible to track, identify, and classify Bitcoin entities within the blockchain network by joining
public addresses and private keys.
Prior studies have tried to classify entities according to classes representing specific entity
behavior within the network [10–12]. These techniques usually consider the whole blockchain
and thus classification is performed considering all network (macro) dynamics among users. First
of all, using the entire blockchain data typically comes at high computational and resource costs,
which could be reduced by considering smaller amounts of input data. Furthermore, increasing the
“temporal resolution” by considering shorter time intervals of blockchain data may highlight network
micro-dynamics, i.e., small, short-term behavioral changes that can change the classification of an
entity over time. These changes in classification could be useful for detecting suspicious activities.
For example, a usually well-performing model for a certain entity class that all of a sudden fails to
detect known elements of that class could be a hint for critical behavioral changes related to attacks or
illicit activities.
The key idea behind our study is that a model trained on a batch with a certain time-interval
should achieve good classification performance when testing it on another temporal batch—if similarity
between behavioral patterns of the detected entities within those batches is sufficiently high.
It is to be noted that the aim of this work is not to directly investigate cyber-attacks or to improve
classification rates of Bitcoin entities, but to investigate the effect of considering Bitcoin blockchain
data as a time-series, dividing it into temporal batches and studying micro-changes of behavioral
entity patterns over time. Results could highlight which entities show relatively consistent behavior
from batch to batch (making them less likely to be affected by illicit activities and narrowing down the
time interval necessary to obtain “typical” entity behavior) and which entities show strongly varying
behavior over time (thus revealing short-term changes in behavior that could suggest suspicious
network activities or sensible targets).
We believe that our novel approach could be valuable for future forensic tools as it may highlight
the importance of considering blockchain data as a time-series to reveal short-term behavioral changes,
hence shifting the paradigm of forensic blockchain analysis from a “macro” or “black-box” approach
towards taking into account network micro-dynamics. As a byproduct, these considerations can reduce
the complexity and the required resources for forensics analysis.
Specifically, the present analysis is based on extending cascading machine learning concepts
presented in Zola et al. [10], which essentially apply ensemble learning and stacking of several
classifiers trained with different datasets derived from blockchain data. The idea behind this
technique is to classify Bitcoin entities using prior classification information, combine them with new
blockchain-derived data, and then compute a final classification to improve predictive performance.
All data were normalized with respect to the considered batches (time-intervals). This operation
allows us to generalize the derived classifiers and use them with data from different sources or from
other blockchains, which increases transferability of our results.
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We carry out four experiments considering different batch sizes, where a cascading approach with
data extracted from blockchain batches is used. We started using a batch size of 60,000 consecutive
blocks (approx. 12 months of data); in the second experiment we used 30,000 consecutive blocks
(approx. six months of data); in the third experiment we chose 20,000 consecutive blocks (approx.
four months of data), and in the last experiment we used 10,000 consecutive blocks (approx. two
months of data). In each experiment, we used one batch to train the initial classifiers, meanwhile the
others—left out from training—were used to test them. This procedure is repeated for each batch
extracted from the blockchain until each one has been used once for training (“k-fold cross-testing”).
These tests allow us to analyze similarities between entity behavior over time and investigate if certain
behavioral patterns are repeated across different blockchain batches. We consider six different types of
Bitcoin entities: Exchange, Gambling, Marketplace, Mining Pool, Mixer, and eWallet. At the end of the
four experiments, following previous studies [4,13] that considered Mining Pool entities as sensitive
targets (potentially subject to cyber-attacks), a deeper analysis of Mining Pool behavior is shown.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work. Afterwards,
Section 3 presents an overview of the used data. Section 4 introduces the graph models and the
machine learning models implemented; then, in Section 5, the experimental analysis is presented.
Finally, in Sections 6 and 7, we draw conclusions and provide some guidelines for future work.
2. Related Works
Bitcoin properties have led hackers to deploy various cyber-attacks in order to introduce
chaos/noise into the network and take advantage of it. In [14], an analysis about the impact of
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks on the volume traded on the Exchange is presented,
in particular regarding 17 attack cases that occurred across 2016 and 2018. In [15], transactions related
to 35 ransomware families (malware) are analyzed, determining a minimum market worth about USD
12,768,536. These kinds of attacks allowed hackers to steal Bitcoin (BTC); for example, as admitted
by Changpeng Zhao (CEO of Binance, one of the largest Exchanges), hackers stole more than 7000
BTC [16], about 40 USD million in 7 May 2019, considering the exchange rate (closing market value on
that day) equals USD 5829.50 [17].
Criminal concerns related to the Bitcoin network can be grouped into three classes: Bitcoin-specific
crimes, money laundering and Bitcoin-facilitated crimes [18]. User anonymity not only has been the
keystone for dissemination of cryptocurrencies, but it has promoted illegal activities and cyber-attacks
within the Bitcoin network. In fact, as discussed in the Introduction, knowing the identity of users
involved in the network helps determine sensible targets [4]. Moreover, short-term changes of entity
behavior, for example in Mining Pools [13], could be symptoms of a cyber-attack.
In [19,20], current measures used by the Bitcoin protocol to preserve anonymity within the
network are analyzed. As shown in [21], such measures are, however, not enough to protect user
privacy. In fact, it is possible to decrease Bitcoin network anonymity by using address clustering and
combining information from various sources. For example, in [22], an address clustering is computed
in order to identify the CryptoLocker (a family of ransomware) and in [23] the clustering is based on
conservative constraints (patterns). Reid et al. [24] exploit topological and external information in
order to investigate a large theft of Bitcoins. Meanwhile, Fleder et al. make use of information scraped
from forums and social media in order to characterize known and unknown users [25].
In [26], a study on two graphs generated by the Bitcoin transaction network using anomaly
detection techniques is presented, aiming to detect which users and transactions were the most
suspicious. Nevertheless, Monamo et al. [27] uses an unsupervised learning algorithm for classifying
anomalies (financial fraud and money laundering) on the Bitcoin network based on transaction patterns.
An unsupervised k-means classifier is applied in [28] in order to identify atypical transactions related
to money laundering. Bartoletti et al. [29] use machine learning algorithms to identify Ponzi schemes
in the Bitcoin network. Yin et al. in [30] apply supervised learning techniques in order to determine a
“big picture” of cybercrime-related entities in the Bitcoin ecosystem.
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In [10,12], methods for attacking Bitcoin user anonymity are presented. Both methods use
the whole blockchain to create supervised machine learning models and classify Bitcoin entities.
In particular, a cascading machine learning model is introduced in [10], which is essentially ensemble
learning based on the stacking concept presented in [31]. The idea of the cascading model is to
implement a cascade of (weak) classifiers, such that prior classification results can be joined and can be
used to enrich a final (strong) classification. The cascading machine learning approach is compared
with other techniques as [11,32], and showed that the new approach not only reduces the complexity of
the model by reducing the features implied in the classification, but also reaches a very high accuracy
considering six Bitcoin entity classes.
In anomaly detection, changes in network traffic are often a symptom of attacks. Nevertheless, it
is generally difficult to detect and evaluate these changes in early stages of an attack as such changes
in traffic cannot easily be distinguished from usual traffic fluctuation [33]. The following studies
applied division of data into subsets or batches, similar to the work presented in this paper. In [34],
a new process for training a hidden Markov model (HMM) to detect a denial-of-service attack (DoS)
in program behavior data (system calls produced by processes of a program) is described, aiming
to reduce training times. Authors first divide the long observation sequence into multiple subsets
of sequences. Then, they join all the generated sub-models reducing the training time by about 60%
compared to conventional training.
The approach of dividing information in subsets is used as well when analyzing graph structures.
In these cases, the evolution of the graph over time is analyzed, creating a graph stream [35].
For example, in [36], a monthly call graph is divided into weekly snapshots in order to consider
new dynamics of the call network and achieve churn prediction. Furthermore, in [37], a parallel
partitioning approach to discover cyber-threats in computer network traffic focusing on substructures
is presented.
In this paper, the idea is to join the machine learning model introduced in [10] with the concept of
batch analysis applied, for example, in anomalies detection [34,38]. We aim to add a “temporal view”
to Bitcoin entity analysis in order to unveil changes in behavioral patterns over time. This approach
provides a magnifying lens allowing us (a) to study how using smaller batches of Bitcoin data affects
classification performance and (b) to analyze micro-dynamics present in the Bitcoin blockchain network.
All used features are normalized in order to reduce dependency on the chosen block size, and results
may help data scientists reduce the complexity and the size of the initial dataset in forensic analysis.
3. Datasets
In studies of Bitcoin behavior, it is difficult to identify a ground-truth labeled dataset due to
the anonymity of the network and due to the activity of its entities, which can change over time.
However, here we aim to analyze these changes and determine how they affect the entity behavior
classification. Such change in the classification over time may help us determine suspicious situations
and sensitive targets.
We therefore used two datasets, the first one downloaded from WalletExplorer [39]—a platform
that can be considered a benchmark for Bitcoin entities detection—and the second one consisting of
Bitcoin blockchain data downloaded from the mainnet [40].
WalletExplorer is a web-page where data and information about different known entities detected
until today are collected. The dataset is continuously being updated and its information has been used
as a starting point for many Bitcoin-related studies, such as [15,32,41]. For our purpose, each entity
was downloaded with its origin name and its related detected addresses.
The downloaded entities belong to seven different classes:
• Exchange: entities that allow their customers to trade cryptocurrencies or to exchange cryptos for
fiat currencies (or vice versa);
• Gambling: entities that offer gambling services based on Bitcoin currency (casino, betting,
roulette, etc.);
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• Mining Pool: entities composed of a group of miners that work together sharing their resources in
order to reduce the volatility of their returns;
• Mixer: entities that offer a service to obscure the traceability of their Bitcoin clients’ transactions;
• Marketplace: entities allowing to buy any kind of goods or services using cryptocurrencies. They
are frequently used to buy illegal goods;
• eWallet: entities that allow an individual to create online accounts that can be used to receive
and send money. Users never need to download the Bitcoin software themselves and all of the
user’s transactions are made on behalf of the user by the eWallet service, using keys controlled by
the service [23];
• Lending: entities that allow users to lend Bitcoins and passively earn interests on it, or allow them
to request a loan.
As shown in Table 1, 315 different entities and more than 18,000,000 addresses were downloaded
from WalletExplorer. However, after creating a first overview of the dataset, we decided to not use the
Lending class because seven entities were considered too few to implement and train the cascading
machine learning system.
Table 1. Overview of WalletExplorer entities and address data.











Exchange Ex 137 124 90.51 9,950,742 6,361,096 63.93
Gambling Gmb 76 59 77.63 3,054,477 1,711,407 56.03
Marketplace Mrk 20 19 95.00 2,349,300 171,966 7.32
Mining Pool Pool 25 17 68.00 76,297 43,041 56.41
Mixer Mxr 37 35 94.59 476,400 273,228 57.35
eWallet eWal 13 13 100.0 2,604,111 2,191,129 84.14
Lending Len 7 - - 113,900 - -
Total 315 267 18,625,227 10,751,867
The second dataset was directly downloaded from the Bitcoin mainnet through the Bitcoin Core
program [42]. Our analysis focuses on the last (about) three years of lifetime of Bitcoin blockchain only,
so we used the Bitcoin blockchain data created from blocks height 390,000 to 570,000, corresponding
to blocks mined from 24 December 2015, 5:33:51 p.m. until 3 April 2019, 9:20:08 a.m., respectively.
This decision was taken in order to decrease the computational cost for carrying out the experiments.
Table 1 shows the amount of different entities and addresses calculated in the last three
years as well, and the ratio between the samples in the considered time interval compared to the
whole population.
The final dataset was composed by data belonging to six classes: Exchange, Gambling, Marketplace,
Mining Pool, Mixer, and eWallet. All entities were represented by more than 65% of distinct samples,
and also by more than 50% of distinct addresses, except for the Marketplace with just 7.32% of samples.
A first analysis highlighted that these Marketplace entities were mainly active in the first six years of the
blockchain lifetime. Then, over time, they were closed from Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) in case
of illicit activities or owners decided to close their services.
In this study, the downloaded Bitcoin data of the last three years were cross-referenced with the
(labelled) WalletExplorer data in order to re-size the original dataset and remove all unlabelled and
unusable data for our supervised cascading machine learning approach.
4. Methodology
In this section, the four graph models used in this work are presented: address-transaction graph,
entity-transaction graph, and 1_motif and 2_motif graph. Each graph representation allows us to
analyze a different aspect of the behavior of an entity. These graph models represent the sources for
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extracting dataframes (tabulated data), which were used for implementing the cascading machine
learning models.
4.1. Blockchain and Motifs’ Graphs
Blockchain data can be directly represented through an address-transaction graph (Figure 1).
In this graph, vertices represent addresses and transactions, while directed edges (arrows) between
addresses and transactions indicate incoming relations, and directed edges between transactions and
addresses correspond to outgoing relations. Each directed edge can also include additional information
such as values, time-stamps, etc.
Figure 1. Address-transaction graph computed with one block of the Bitcoin mainnet.
According to Bitcoin.org [43], each single user has the responsibility for adopting good practices
in order to protect his/her anonymity and remain private. The basic recommendation is to use a new
Bitcoin address for any new payment, and additionally use multiple wallets for different purposes.
These suggestions create new dynamics in the network increasing the complexity of user behavior
detection. Nevertheless, over time, these same concepts were used to define several heuristic properties
with the aim to find related addresses for subsequent address clustering. This process is used to find all
addresses that belong to a certain user, and this allows us to introduce the entity concept. In particular,
we refer to an entity as a physical person or organization related to one or multiple public key addresses
belonging to one or more wallets. Using these clusters of addresses and the relation among transactions,
it is possible to create the entity-transaction graph starting from the address-transaction graph.
Heuristic properties have been developed and presented in different studies such as [20,23,44].
However, in this study, we do not need to apply heuristic assumptions since, as indicated in Section 3,
the Bitcoin blockchain data were combined with labelled data gathered from WalletExplorer, such that
relations among addresses (i.e., clusters) are known.
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The motifs graph used here is usually applied in bioinformatics, specifically in metabolic network
analysis [45]. However, prior studies such as [11,32] have successfully translated the concept of motifs
to Bitcoin analyses.
According to [10], a N_moti f graph is a graph composed by paths from the entity-transaction
graph with length 2N that starts and ends with an entity. Let (e1, .., eM) ∈ E be a class of entities and
(t1, .., tN) ∈ T be a class of transactions, with M ≤ N + 1, then:
N_moti f = (e1, t1, ..., tN, eM). (1)
From this particular graph, it is possible to extract information concerning the relations among
entities, but also concerning the topology that such relations create among entities. If two different
entities are connected through one transaction, the topology is called Direct Distinct. If one entity is
connected with itself (again through one transaction) the topology is called Direct Loop (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Example of 2_motif graph topology.
Starting from the results presented in [10], in the present study, only the 1_moti f and 2_moti f
graphs were used.
4.2. Temporal Batch
Larger time intervals may cover specific behavioral changes of an entity affecting its detection.
Moreover, the amount of data in a larger time interval increases the complexity of the problem,
often leading to the creation of highly non-transparent “black-box” models. Our approach involves
dissecting data temporally, so dividing everything into smaller batches that can then be studied by
themselves (thus using “smaller black-boxes”, which may help to understand better the internal
dynamics within the large black-box of the full data).
The idea behind our approach is that a model trained on a batch with a certain time-interval can
be used for unveiling behavioral entity patterns when testing it on another temporal batch. Thereby,
higher classification performance would relate to higher similarity between behavioral entity patterns
within the training and test batch. Hence, in this analysis, it is important to divide the whole Bitcoin
dataset into temporal batches, where each batch represents a dataset composed by the transactions
belonging to a fixed number of consecutive blocks.
Let min_blk be the minimum block height and max_blk the maximum block height in the
(considered) Bitcoin blockchain data, and let batch_size be the size (in blocks) of a single batch, then the





In our analysis, we considered min_blk with a value of 390,000 blocks and max_blk with a value
of 570,000, and four different values for batch_size. We started creating batches of 60,000 consecutive
blocks (representing approx. 12 months) in the first experiment. In the second one, we chose a value of
30,000 (representing approx. six months), in the third one, a value of 20,000 (representing approx. four
months) was used and, finally, in the last experiment, the batch_size was fixed to 10,000 consecutive
blocks (representing approx. two months).
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Table 2 shows the number of batches considered in each experiment and the related distinct
known entities divided per class. This table shows that the majority of the detected entities belonged
to batches with “old or past” data, since the number of distinct known entities for almost all the classes
decreases over time.
















1 122 51 18 14 30 12
2 104 46 12 12 12 11
















1 121 50 14 13 18 12
2 109 40 17 11 20 12
3 102 46 12 11 11 10
4 89 27 6 7 3 11
5 74 23 5 6 1 9
















1 119 50 14 13 13 11
2 110 41 15 10 18 12
3 104 39 10 11 11 10
4 100 42 12 10 11 10
5 90 39 10 8 3 10
6 79 24 4 6 2 11
7 74 21 1 6 1 9
8 63 22 6 5 1 7
















1 117 48 13 13 8 11
2 105 44 13 11 8 11
3 106 40 9 10 13 12
4 98 37 15 10 11 12
5 93 37 6 8 8 10
6 99 36 10 10 8 10
7 95 36 11 8 8 10
8 93 38 9 10 7 10
9 86 39 9 7 2 10
10 80 25 4 5 3 8
11 75 22 4 6 2 11
12 68 21 4 3 1 7
13 67 19 0 6 1 8
14 63 19 1 4 1 9
15 58 20 4 3 1 6
16 59 19 2 5 1 7
17 57 17 5 3 1 6
18 62 17 0 3 1 7
4.3. Features
In each experiment and for each temporal batch generated, the four graph models presented in
Section 4.1 were created. Then, from each graph model, four dataframes (two-dimensional labelled
data structure or data table with samples as rows and extracted features as columns) were created
extracting several features. All the features are presented in detail in [10]:
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• Entity dataframe contains all features extracted from the entity-transaction graph and contains
a total of seven features.
• Address dataframe contains all features extracted from the address-transaction graph and contains
a total of seven features.
• 1_motif dataframe contains the information directly extracted from the 1_moti f graph and contains
a total of nine features.
• 2_motif dataframe contains information gathered from the 2_moti f graph and contains a total of
18 features.
In order to compare information from different batches, and in order to reduce the complexity
of the models, the features (excluding the ones related to an amount or balance) were normalized
on a range between 0 and 1. This normalization was computed with respect to the minimum and
maximum values in the corresponding batch. This process allow us to re-use these models with other
batch sizes and to use them with input data from other sources/blockchains in future studies.
Let X be the value to be normalized, Xmin the minimum and Xmax the maximum of the considered





4.4. Cascading Machine Learning
In this study, we used and extended the cascading machine learning concepts introduced in [10],
which have shown excellent classification results when using the whole blockchain data. As mentioned
in Section 2, the cascading machine learning optimizes the number of features used in the classification
and ensures high accuracy value, comparing them with output accuracy of other techniques [10].
Our cascading model is a type of ensemble learning applying stacking techniques [46]. The idea
transferred to the Bitcoin network is based on enriching Bitcoin entity data with information obtained
from prior classifications creating cascading classifiers, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Cascading machine learning architecture.
The first step to create the cascading system was to split the address, 1_motif and 2_motif
dataframes into train/test datasets. In particular, this operation was computed using a proportion of
50/50. Then, the created train datasets were used to implement the weak classifiers called C_address,
C_motif1 and C_motif2 in relation with their own input data (zero-level in Figure 3). This process was
computed by applying a k-fold cross-validation with k = 5. In k-fold cross-validation, the dataset is
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divided into k folds, where k− 1 folds are used for training the model and the one left out during the
training phase is used to validate it. The whole process is repeated until each fold is used only once
for validating.
Once the cross-validation was ended and the models were generated/trained, the test dataset
was used as input. The output of the classification from the Level 0 classifiers was joined with the
information in the entity dataframe in order to create the enriched entity dataframe. Then, this new
enriched dataframe was used for training the final (strong) classifier called C_final (first-level
in Figure 3).
Thanks to the initial dataset split into train and test, the information generated from the weak
classifiers was created from a completely unseen dataset. In fact, if the data that were used to train the
zero-level learner were also used to generate the enriched dataset for training the first-level learner,
there would be a high risk of overfitting [47], which hence has been avoided here.
The outgoing information from the zero-level classifiers was processed following an enrichment
process, as indicated in [10]. This process consists of assigning one of the six possible output classes to
each entry in the input dataframe and joining the input label (from WalletExplorer) with the computed
output class. Then, the input label was grouped counting how many times a sample belonging to
a particular entity has been detected in each of the considered classes. This value was then normalized
as indicated in Equation (4), where E represents the entities set and N is the number of considered
classes (N = 6 in this study). The term ‖ Pe| j ‖ represents how many times a sample originally labelled
with entity e generates a prediction belonging to class j, while the term ∑Ni=1 ‖ Pe| i ‖ counts all the
predictions generated from samples with labelled input belonging to entity e:
∀e ∈ E
‖ Pe| j ‖
∑Ni=1 ‖ Pe| i ‖
∗ 100 with j ∈ N. (4)
Finally, the enrichment process allows us to generate a set of six new features from each weak
model, which were used to enrich (extend) the entity dataframe extracted from blockchain data.
In this paper, we implemented the first three classifiers (weak) as Random Forest (RF) and the
final one as Gradient Boosting (GB) model, since such implementation has been shown to yield good
classification performance in terms of Precision, Recall, and F1-score for entity classification [10].
Specifically, all Random Forest models were implemented with the number of estimators set to 10,
with a Gini function to measure the quality of the split and without a maximum depth of the tree.
The Gradient Boosting model was implemented with the number of estimators set to 100, the learning
rate was set to 0.1, and the maximum depth for limiting the number of nodes was set to 3.
In order to unveil patterns in entity behavior and detect the similarity among training and
test batches, we evaluated the classification performance in terms of Precision, Recall, and F1-score
calculated per class:
• Precision is the number of true positives over the total number of true positives plus false positives.
It represents a measure of a classifier’s exactness given as a value between 0 and 1, with 1 relating
to high precision;
• Recall is the number of true positives over the number of true positives plus false negatives.
It represents a measure of a classifier’s completeness given as a value between 0 and 1;
• F1-score is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall. It takes values between 0 and 1, with 1
relating to perfect Precision and Recall, and is calculated with Equation (5);
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4.5. K-Fold Cross-Testing
In this study, we aimed to analyze how entity behavior changes over time. The idea is to detect
similarity between the distinct temporal batches, represented by good classification performance
that indicates the presence of a recurrent pattern. To achieve this goal, we apply a type of “k-fold
cross-testing”, which allows us to estimate the performance of the implemented cascading machine
learning approach. This procedure recalls concepts from k-fold cross-validation and applies them to
testing as well, hence the chosen name. In particular, this method allows us to evaluate similarity
among different batches generating unique output values for each trained model.
In “k-fold cross-testing”, we divided the dataset into k folds (or batches), as explained in the
previous section. This batch creation was done without shuffling the data because in Bitcoin analysis it
is important to maintain the sequentiality of the data. The number of the generated folds was computed
through Equation (2), which generated respectively 3-fold cross-testing for the first experiment, 6-fold
cross-testing for the second one, 9-fold cross-testing for the third experiment, and 18-fold cross-testing
for the last one. In general, the k-fold cross-testing approach generates a total of k distinct models,
each of them obtained by training a system with just one batch (i.e., each fold is used exactly one time
for training a model). Then, each model is tested with the remaining k− 1 batches left out during the
training, as shown in Figure 4. The “k-fold cross-testing” generates k outputs, one for each trained
model. A single output represents the average and the standard deviation of the k− 1 tests computed
over the same trained model.
Figure 4. Example of k-fold cross-testing applied with k = 3.
5. Results
In this paper, we present an analysis for evaluating similarity between behavioral patterns of
Bitcoin entities using cascading machine learning. The presented process introduces a “temporal view”
of the blockchain data aiming to evaluate short-term changes in Bitcoin entity behavior. The approach
consists of dividing the whole blockchain into several batches, in order to reduce the complexity of
the problem, reducing the amount of data, simplifying the implemented models, and increasing the
transferability of the solution.
In order to unveil behavioral patterns in the Bitcoin network and study how the size of the batches
affects the final classification, four experiments are presented. Each experiment was achieved with
a different value of batch size, respectively with 60,000 blocks (approx. 12 months), 30,000 (approx.
six months), 20,000 (approx. four months) and 10,000 blocks (approx. two months). The discovered
behavioral patterns were divided into six classes: Exchange, Gambling, Market, Mining Pool, Mixer,
and eWallet.
Figures 5 and 6 show the F1-score calculated in each experiment separated per class. In particular,
in each graph, the x-axis represents the number of batch used to train the models and the y-value
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represents the F1-score computed using “k-fold cross-testing” (Section 4.5). The F1-score values are
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Figure 5. F1-score computed in the four presented experiments with different batch_size for Exchange,
Gambling, and Market classes.
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Figure 6. F1-score computed in the four presented experiments with different batch_size for Mining
Pool, Mixer, and eWallet classes.
The graphs in Figures 5 and 6 indicate that Exchange, Gambling, and eWallet behavior are only
slightly affected by the chosen batch size. In fact, decreasing the batch size, the average F1-score
over samples belonging to these three classes is weakly increased. At the same time, smaller batch
size penalizes the ability of the models to discover Mixer and Market elements and generates strong
changes in the detection of the Mining Pool class. Behavioral changes of those Mining Pools become
visible when decreasing the batch size to 20, 000 blocks, for example.
These trends are confirmed in Table 3, where the overall average F1-score and standard deviation
are reported for each experiment. One can observe that reducing the batch size slightly increases the
detection of Exchange and Gambling elements. In particular, considering data from 10,000 blocks
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(fourth experiment), F1-score values of 0.72 and 0.39, respectively, were reached. However, the batch
size reduction also increases the variability of the classification, generating high standard deviation
values for four of the six considered classes. The highest values of standard deviation are obtained
for classifying Mining Pool and Market elements. These two classes generate a standard deviation of
0.218 for a F1-score value of 0.29, and 0.112 for a F1-score value of 0.08, respectively.


























Exchange 0.68 0.047 0.71 0.039 0.70 0.040 0.72 0.050
Gambling 0.34 0.052 0.34 0.071 0.32 0.070 0.39 0.084
Market 0.07 0.050 0.06 0.054 0.08 0.099 0.08 0.112
Mining Pool 0.34 0.038 0.24 0.175 0.28 0.138 0.29 0.218
Mixer 0.16 0.143 0.08 0.083 0.10 0.128 0.07 0.099
eWallet 0.10 0.037 0.15 0.126 0.14 0.098 0.13 0.102
The results shown in Figure 6 and Table 3 motivated us to analyze more in-depth the strong
changes that could be observed in the Mining Pool class detection, which, following our initial
idea, relate to changes in behavioral patterns that only become visible when reducing the batch size.
For batch size 20,000, for example, Mining Pool behavior trained with temporal batch 7 yielded on
average much better classification results than the model trained on other batches. This shows that
the Mining Pool behavior captured in batch 7 is more representative than the behavior defined in all
other batches.
Figure 7 shows detailed associations among F1-score, recall, precision, and normalized number of
samples for the Mining Pool behavior for each batch and batch size as Radar graphs. In particular,
the highest values of recall and F1-score were obtained with batch size set to 20,000 blocks training
the models with batch number 7 (0.46 and 0.52, respectively), while the highest values of precision is
obtained by training the models with batch number 9 (0.86), as shown in Figure 7c. Decreasing the
batch size down to 10,000 generates a linear variance in precision between 0.25 and 0.75, keeping the
F1-score in range 0.25–0.50 (Figure 7d).
Figure 8 provides another interesting picture of the Mining Pool behavior. These graphs represent
confusion matrices where the values of shown F1-scores were not averaged but represent the actual
values computed for each test run. Each cell-value represents the F1-score of the models trained with
the i-th batch and tested with the j-th batch. In case of i = j, the value was not computed setting the
cell to −1 (due to this, they are shown in black).
Using heatmaps [48], it becomes clear that decreasing the batch size generates an improvement
in terms of F1-score in the detection of Mining Pool behavioral patterns (Figure 8a–d). In the first
experiment, there were 0 elements with F1-score above 0.70 (a threshold that we chose to indicate a
good classification). In fact, the highest value was 0.38. In the second experiment, there was just one
test with F1-score above the chosen threshold reaching the value of 0.71. In the third experiment, no
values above the threshold were achieved; however, the highest value of 0.67 was reached in three
different cases. In the fourth experiment (smallest batch size of 10,000), 14 tests presented values
above the threshold reaching a maximum value of 0.88. Interestingly, Figure 8c (batch size 20,000)
clearly shows how “early” models (trained on temporally earlier blocks) up to batch number 6 do not
yield good classification performance in neither previous nor following batches. Models trained on
batches 6–8, though, achieved good performance in the first batches highlighting that generally it was
more difficult to “predict the future” (earlier models perform poorly for future batches). Moreover,
Mining Pool behavior in batch 7, for example, seems to represent a “typical” behavioral pattern that is
recurrent over time across several batches.
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Figure 8. Mining Pool F1-score of each test in the four presented experiments.
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6. Discussion
The general aim of this paper was to address problems that are associated with using the
entire blockchain for entity classification in machine learning forensics—which are higher complexity
(requiring larger computational efforts) and the inherent problem of hiding network micro-dynamics
potentially important for detecting short-term changes in entity behavior. We therefore considered
Bitcoin blockchain data as time-series and divided it into temporal batches of varying size.
Our study showed that considering the blockchain as a time-series (i.e., dividing Bitcoin
data into temporal batches) yields interesting insights into behavioral changes of network entities
over time, which may be a starting point for future studies focusing on the investigation of
network micro-dynamics.
The key idea behind our approach was that a model trained on a batch of a certain time-interval
should achieve good classification performance when testing it on another temporal batch, in case
entity behavioral patterns (described by the chosen, extracted features) within those batches is similar.
Thus, each temporal batch was used to define and extract entity behavior, which allowed us to analyze
how the chosen interval and batch size affects classification performance. Classification methods were
based on cascading machine learning principles and “k-fold cross-testing”, which implies training
models on one batch and testing it on all other batches until all batches have been used for training.
From Section 5, and in particular from Figures 5 and 6, we observed that the choice of batch size did
affect all considered classes. Exchange, Gambling, and eWallet classifications were only slightly affected
and yielded a weakly increasing trend in F1-score with decreasing batch size. In particular, reducing
the batch size (thus considering micro-dynamics within the Bitcoin network) did not show great
changes in the final classification of these classes. Moreover, for the Exchange class, this demonstrated
that a smaller temporal batch size indeed seemed to be sufficient for Exchange classification—results
suggest that it is not necessary to use the full blockchain data to obtain good classification rates.
Market and Mixer classification performance instead worsened when decreasing the batch size.
This is reflected in Figure 5e and Figure 6e where F1-scores of these classes reached values close to
or equal to 0. In this case, results probably depended on the small sample size of Market and Mixer
entities prevalent in smaller batches.
However, the most interesting effect of batch size reduction occurred for the Mining Pool
classification. In fact, Mining Pool classification performance changed dramatically when moving to
smaller batch sizes, interestingly showing increasing standard deviations of averaged F1-scores for
smaller batches, hinting at higher performance differences from batch to batch. These results led us to
analyze Mining Pool behavior more in detail—especially as this class represents a sensitive target for
cyber-attacks, as presented in [4,13].
Confusion matrices shown in Figure 8a indicate that, for Mining Pool behavior, the best
classification was obtained by training models with “recent” data in order to predict “past” behavior
when moving to smaller batch sizes, as the majority of the highest F1-scores were below the main
diagonal. This suggests that, generally, it was more difficult to “predict the future”. In fact, earlier
models did not capture future behavior, but recent models did seem to contain behavioral elements
that can be seen in the past as well as new elements belonging to more recent data. This could imply
a certain development of network behavior over time, using old patterns of which certain features are
kept but where new features evolve. Future work could investigate these findings more in detail in
other networks as well.
Our findings further highlight that decreasing the batch size (to 10,000, i.e., two months of data,
for example) provided a higher “temporal resolution” allowing us to detect behavioral changes that
were not visible with larger batch sizes. In particular, results shown in Figure 8d corresponding to the
model trained with batch number 12, are interesting. It is possible to observe that the model achieved
good classification scores for test batch numbers 1, 2, 3 and 5, but decreased its accuracy in batch 4.
This situation could be a symptom of a suspicious activity (or cyber-attacks) of entities in the fourth
test batch. In fact, the low score in batch 4 suggests a sudden change of behavior. These kinds of
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changes can only be appreciated focusing on a small time interval, as using the whole blockchain
data most likely would hide these micro-effects. We believe that such findings for particular entities
could be investigated more in detail in future work by cross-referencing them a posteriori with known
attacks or malicious activities.
Our results, compared with results presented in [10] (where the whole blockchain is considered),
showed lower classification rates across all considered classes (from 30% to 90%). However,
as mentioned in Section 1, improving classification rates was not the aim of this study. Our idea
was to introduce temporal batch division of blockchain data and aimed to analyze whether this
approach may uncover micro-dynamics that determine changes in entity behavior. In fact, sudden,
short-term behavioral changes of a fixed entity represented by changes of classification scores could be
a symptom of suspicious behavior or an attack. Rather than looking to absolute classification scores,
we therefore focused on changes or variability of scores from batch to batch.
Furthermore, it became apparent that batch size affects the detection of changes in entity behavior
in different ways. A batch size that is too small seems to create difficulty in micro-dynamics detection
in a small dataset (for example for Mixer, Market and Mining Pool), but entity behavior in general
(Exchange, Gambling and eWallet) is enhanced.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study using temporal batch division of Bitcoin
blockchain data, and hence we are unable to perform a comparison against similar approaches. To date,
no other study has focused on detecting similarities between entity behavioral patterns in various time
batches of Bitcoin blockchain data.
We acknowledge that our approach does not fully get rid of the “black-box model”, but we believe
that our temporal dissection into “smaller black-boxes” has shown interesting changes in entity pattern
behavior and consider it a first step towards investigating Bitcoin behavioral pattern evolution in
much more detail.
One major drawback of our approach is the dependence on WalletExplorer data. This dataset
allows us to only include well-known entities that were already detected, while special entities or
individual users could not be included.
Furthermore, our work provides guidelines which could be used to model a “typical” Mining
Pool and, in particular, we plan to use this information to develop a model to detect abnormal or
illicit behavior and behavioral changes posing possible security threats—for example, by exploiting
results presented in [49], where it is stated that a type of cyber-attack produces short-term effects in
the Mining Pool itself.
Future development could also be aimed at providing customization of behavioral patterns and
simulating them in a controlled environment. This would allow researchers to replicate “typical”
entity behavior or specific types of attacks or illicit activities related to certain entities. Furthermore,
the controlled environment, for example the one presented in [50], could be used to detect limitations
of the protocol, creating specific scenarios or defining new entity behavior not yet discovered in
the mainnet.
7. Conclusions
We conclude that the right choice of time interval size helped reduce the complexity for some
classes and helped with the detection of abnormal/interesting activities and behavioral changes for
other classes of Bitcoin entities. Due to these properties, we believe that the presented analysis can be
a starting point to significantly improve some forensics tools that currently apply machine learning
on the whole blockchain—providing novel, more in-depth insight into what is happening within the
Bitcoin network by carefully choosing the “temporal resolution” of the analysis.
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